科研 Skill
实验经济学设计
experimental-economics-design
Designs incentivized lab, online, or lab-in-field experiments: treatment and payoff design, deception/IRB norms, and oTree/z-Tree setup. Use when designing a behavioral-economics study.
SKILL.md
Experimental Economics Design
Purpose
Covers the design of incentivized economics experiments — laboratory,
online (Prolific/MTurk/CloudResearch), or lab-in-field — distinct from the
field-RCT skills elsewhere in this marketplace (rct-core-design and
siblings in the social-science plugin), which focus on randomized policy or
program evaluation in the field. Experimental economics instead tests a
specific behavioral or strategic hypothesis (risk preferences, bargaining,
public-goods contribution, market behavior, discrimination) under controlled,
usually monetarily incentivized conditions, often grounded in a game-theoretic
or decision-theoretic model whose predictions the experiment is built to
distinguish.
Use this skill for designing the experiment itself: treatments, incentive
structure, session protocol, and software setup. For sample-size and power
calculations once the design is fixed, pair with rct-power-calculations;
for randomization mechanics, pair with rct-randomization; for analyzing the
resulting data, pair with rct-data-analysis or ols-regression.
When to Use
Use when the request mentions:
- lab experiment, economics experiment, behavioral experiment design
- oTree, z-Tree, LIONESS Lab, or similar experiment software
- incentive-compatible design, induced-value theory, show-up fee
- within-subject vs. between-subject design for an economic game
- deception in experimental economics, IRB for incentivized studies
- online experiment on Prolific/MTurk for an economic task
Do not use for:
- field-RCT program evaluation design (
rct-core-design) - survey experiments embedded in opinion polling without monetary incentives
(
conjoint-experiment,survey-research-architect) - game-theoretic model derivation itself without an empirical test plan
Core Workflow
Step 1 — State the Theoretical Prediction(s) Being Tested
Write down the competing point predictions (e.g., "the standard self-interest model predicts X; a fairness/reciprocity model predicts Y") the experiment is built to distinguish. An experiment without a model to test against is a demonstration, not a test — design the treatments so that the competing theories make different, observable predictions.
Step 2 — Choose the Game/Task and Treatment Structure
- Select the canonical paradigm that operationalizes the construct (ultimatum/dictator game for fairness, public-goods game for cooperation, trust game for trust/reciprocity, first-price/second-price auction for bidding behavior, BDM mechanism for willingness-to-pay elicitation).
- Decide between-subject (cleaner causal identification, no spillover across conditions, needs more subjects) vs. within-subject (more statistical power per subject, but risks order effects and demand effects — randomize order and test for it).
- If multiple treatments, map each to the specific model comparison from Step 1; do not add treatments that do not sharpen a theoretical contrast.
Step 3 — Design the Incentive Structure
- Apply induced-value theory: subjects' payoffs must be monotonically tied to the decisions being studied, salient (paid in real money, not hypothetical "points" unless explicitly studying hypothetical-bias), and dominant (large enough relative to subjects' alternative use of time to matter).
- Decide the payment rule: pay every decision, or randomly select one decision per subject to pay (random incentive/lottery system) — the latter preserves incentive compatibility across multiple within-subject tasks at lower cost; document why it does when used.
- Set a show-up fee that does not swamp the treatment-relevant payoff variation, and state currency/PPP-adjusted amounts for cross-country comparisons.
Step 4 — Decide on Deception and Clear It Ethically
Economics experiments conventionally prohibit deception (unlike some
psychology traditions) because a participant pool that learns it has been
deceived distrusts instructions in all future sessions, contaminating the
subject pool for every other researcher using it. Default to no deception;
if a design element could be perceived as deceptive (e.g., a non-strategic
confederate/robot player), disclose this to subjects before or immediately
after the session per field norms, and document the justification for IRB.
Pair with rct-ethics-registration for the registration and informed-consent
documentation mechanics.
Step 5 — Build the Session Protocol
- Write the instructions subjects actually read: neutral framing (avoid loaded terms like "partner" vs. "opponent" unless framing is the treatment itself), comprehension-check questions before play, and a fixed script for the experimenter to avoid uncontrolled experimenter-demand variation across sessions.
- Decide group/matching protocol: fixed partners, random re-matching each round (stranger matching), or perfect strangers (no repeat matching) — this affects whether reputation/repeated-game effects can contaminate a one-shot-game inference.
- Pre-register the number of rounds, matching protocol, and primary outcome before data collection.
Step 6 — Choose and Configure the Platform
- oTree (Python/Django-based): best for multiplayer interactive games with real-time matching; open source, runs in-lab or online.
- z-Tree: the long-standing lab standard, Pascal-based, strong at complex market/auction experiments; in-lab only (no native online mode).
- Qualtrics/LIONESS Lab: adequate for single-player decision tasks (risk elicitation, individual choice) without real-time multiplayer interaction; not suitable for synchronous bargaining games.
- Prolific/CloudResearch/MTurk for online subject recruitment: specify screening criteria, attention checks, and bot/inattentive-respondent exclusion rules set before data collection.
Step 7 — Plan Attrition, Comprehension Failures, and Exclusions
State in advance how subjects who fail comprehension checks, drop out mid-session, or show evidence of inattention (online) will be handled — excluded, re-shown instructions, or retained with a robustness check both ways. Deciding this after seeing the data invites p-hacking.
Prerequisites
- A specific behavioral or game-theoretic hypothesis with competing point predictions, not just "see if people cooperate."
- A funded or budgeted subject-payment plan (induced-value incentives, show-up fees); experiments without real monetary stakes should explicitly flag the hypothetical-bias risk.
- IRB/ethics approval appropriate to the institution before running human subjects, and a lab or online-panel account (oTree/z-Tree server, or a Prolific/MTurk account) to field the study.
Limitations
- Lab behavior may not generalize to naturalistic field settings (external validity); lab-in-field designs mitigate but do not eliminate this gap — state the intended scope of generalization explicitly.
- Online samples (Prolific/MTurk) differ demographically from traditional undergraduate lab pools and from the general population; do not claim population-representative estimates without a matched or weighted sample.
- This skill does not implement the statistical analysis of resulting data;
pair with
rct-data-analysisorols-regressionfor that, and withrct-power-calculationsfor a priori sample-size planning. - Platform-specific quirks (oTree version compatibility, z-Tree Windows-only lab requirement) change over time; verify current software documentation before finalizing the technical build.
Quality Checklist
- Competing theoretical predictions stated before the design is built
- Incentive structure satisfies monotonicity, salience, dominance
- Deception avoided, or explicitly justified and disclosed per field norms
- Matching protocol (fixed/random/stranger) stated and justified
- Comprehension checks and exclusion rules pre-registered, not decided post hoc
- Platform choice matches the interaction structure (multiplayer real-time vs. individual choice)
示例提示词
我想设计一个激励相容的最后通牒博弈实验,用oTree在线收集数据。
所属插件
安装该插件会一并获得同领域的 40 个 Skill / MCP。
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常见问题
实验经济学设计能做什么?
Designs incentivized lab, online, or lab-in-field experiments: treatment and payoff design, deception/IRB norms, and oTree/z-Tree setup. Use when designing a behavioral-economics study。
如何安装实验经济学设计?
在科搭 Codar 左侧点击「插件」,在「组件」页签搜索「实验经济学设计」并安装;在 Claude Code 或 Codex 中可以发送本页的安装提示词,或下载 Skill 包后解压到 ~/.claude/skills 或 ~/.codex/skills。
实验经济学设计需要哪些权限?
该科研 Skill没有声明额外权限;执行具体操作时仍由 Agent 按自身规则请求确认。
实验经济学设计经过官方审核吗?
是。SpeedSkills 收录的每个版本都会记录内容摘要与权限声明,当前版本已通过安全审核。